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I would like to begin by thanking Christine Koggel for the marvellous work she has done in 
organizing this conference. It was her knowledge and influence within development ethics 
and within feminist philosophy that we can thank for bringing so many of you here today. 
And you really have come from far and wide. The program lists participants from twenty 
countries. So I would also like to thank you for making what for some was a considerable 
effort to join us for these next three days to discuss Gender Justice and Development: Local 
and Global – along with other topics in development ethics. 
Now, speaking of development ethics, I would guess that most of you have not attended a 
development ethics conference before. In a way, that is not surprising. There are many 
people who contribute to development ethics without saying so and without describing 
themselves as development ethicists. Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and Thomas Pogge 
are three examples. Whenever I reflect on this, I am reminded of Moliere’s character 
Monsieur Jourdain, the bourgeois gentleman, who remarks, ‘Good heavens! For more than 
forty years I have been speaking prose without knowing it.’ And so I could ask many of you 
in this audience, ‘How long have you been speaking development ethics, without knowing 
it?’ 
In light of this, I thought it would be useful to begin this conference with some remarks on 
what development ethics is. I will not try to do this in any comprehensive way. Instead, I will 
draw your attention to seven broad ethical values that have become central to the theory and 
practice of development ethics. I will say something about how these seven values have 
acquired such prominence. And this will set the stage for asking what development ethics 
and gender justice have to do with each other. My goal here will be a very modest one: only 
to open this question for the further discussions that will follow in these next three days. 
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What, then, is development ethics? I want to begin with a thought from our late colleague 
Denis Goulet, who inspired so many of us take up development ethics. Denis observed there 
are two directions in which development can go. Some development is worthwhile because it 
leads to improvements in people's lives. In other cases, development leads in the opposite 
direction, making people's lives worse. This can be called 'maldevelopment'. I suppose, this 
distinction between worthwhile development and maldevelopment could be regarded by 
some as a technical distinction between more effective and less effective means for 
achieving development. But Goulet’s inspiration was to propose that this distinction is not 
merely technical, it is a normative distinction, based on values that worthwhile development 
is expected to serve and advance. Goulet’s idea was that development is worthwhile when it 
serves certain values, whereas maldevelopment does a disservice to them (Goulet 1995; 
Goulet 1997; Goulet 2006).  
Well, what might these values be? How on earth can we reliably find out what they are? One 
approach might be to apply some of the great ethical theories. Implicitly, that is what Peter 
Singer does when he applies his version of consequentialism to issues of global poverty and 
climate change. Similarly, Onora O’Neill and Adela Cortina have taken Kantian perspectives 
on development (O’Neill 1986; Crocker 2008, 218-254). 
I prefer a vantage point that is a little closer to the ground. In fact, people who engage 
closely with the practice of development have been debating these questions about good 
development versus maldevelopment for at least six decades. I have in mind people who 
work for development banks, people who set development policy, and people who manage 
development projects, but also the people who are affected by development projects and the 
advocacy groups and networks that support them. And, of course, academics, like most of us 
here, have also engaged in these debates. What is at issue has often been misdescribed as 
‘What is development?’ But what these debates were really about, I think, is what 
development ought to be – and what it should not.  
So let me give you a brief history of these debates. You can find a more extensive and 
careful presentation of them in Chapter 6 of my co-authored book, Displacement by 
Development: Ethics, Rights, and Responsibilities (Penz, Drydyk and Bose 2011).  
After the Second World War, ‘development’ meant post-war reconstruction. Starting some 
fifteen years later, the idea of development was applied to the formerly colonized countries 
that had just won their independence. Then began a dialectical pattern that repeated itself 
many times over. This dialectic begins with ideas of development that guide national and 
international policies and projects. Many of these turn out to cause unexpected harm to the 
people who were meant to be helped by them. Where people are capable of resisting, they 
often do resist. Their challenges to these ideas and practices of development sometimes 
reverberate upwards through local organizations, political parties, civil society organizations, 
transnational social movements, and in some cases these reverberations create cracks and 
divisions within and among national governments, international development institutions, 
and donor governments. At some stage, academics join in. But here is the key point: 
typically, in this contestation, certain values are implicitly called upon, as everyone struggles 
to say exactly what went wrong.  
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If we study this repeated dialectic, to look for the values that have been used to distinguish 
maldevelopment from worthwhile development, what do we find? So far, seven key ethical 
values have been most prominent. 
First, worthwhile development must enhance people's well-being. This is the first principle 
of the human development approach founded by the late Mahbub ul Haq (Haq  1995). It is 
here that development ethicists disagree with some development economists, who identify 
development not with enhanced well-being but with simple economic growth.  We point out 
that you can have periods of growth in which living standards remain stagnant or even fall, 
and for this reason, development – worthwhile development, that is – should not be 
identified with simple economic growth. There may be much debate about how we should 
understand 'well-being', but nevertheless I think there is now widespread agreement that 
good development must enhance human well-being. 
Second, the development that is worth having must be equitable, both locally and globally. 
This may mean giving priority to the worst off; it may mean bringing more people to a 
threshold of decent living standards; it may mean reducing inequalities of what Sen has 
called 'well-being freedom’; it may mean reducing long-term social inequalities along lines 
of sex, race, ethnicity, disability, and so on. Notwithstanding these differences of 
interpretation, there is widespread agreement that good development contributes to reducing 
these inequalities, while maldevelopment either reproduces them or worsens them. 
Third, good development is not something that is done to people; rather, people must be the 
agents of their own development. At one time this was conceived as participatory 
development; more recently, 'agency' or 'empowerment' have become the leading concepts. 
In my view, the principal value here is empowerment. Good development connects people 
with power in such ways that, through their own agency and decision-making, they can 
improve their lives, and, on the contrary, development that disempowers people is 
maldevelopment. 
Fourth, development is not worthwhile unless it is environmentally sustainable. Once again, 
there is wide agreement on the broad principle, accompanied by wide discussion of what  
'sustainability' should mean. 
While these four values may have been invoked most often in discussions of how 
development can go wrong, three others are no less important. The fifth is that worthwhile 
development does not weaken but strengthens human rights. Sixth, worthwhile development 
reduces social exclusion and enhances cultural freedom – the freedom to be who we are and 
who we want to be. Seventh, worthwhile development is not carried out by corrupt means or 
for corrupt purposes; rather it is carried out with integrity. 
This value framework is not meant to be purely theoretical. On the contrary, it is meant to be 
action-guiding and political. Among people working with development in practice, these 
values can be invoked as bases for criticism of development projects and policies, and for 
uniting opposition against them; on the other hand, these values can also be used as grounds 
for change from within development institutions, or for making graceful concessions, or for 
seeking common ground. 
I am not saying that, either in theory or practice, development ethics is reducible to such a 
framework. Only that the framework is important. But should it have any importance for 
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gender justice? And, conversely, what importance does gender justice have for development 
ethics? 
I would like to take up the second question first. The development ethics values framework 
owes a considerable debt to struggles against the gender injustices of development. Most of 
you are no doubt aware of the pioneering research of Ester Boserup in the 1970s, which 
showed that the modernization of agriculture could make the lives of women worse off in 
numerous ways. In effect, Boserup’s research planted a flag, marking gender inequity as a 
feature of maldevelopment, while at the same time beginning a new paradigm for 
understanding the gendered dimensions of development (Boserup 1970). Before that time, it 
had been held quite commonly that development consists simply in modernization, or 
economic growth, and equity had nothing to do with it. As awareness of the gender inequity 
of economic development became stronger, the view that equity is irrelevant became ever 
more untenable.  
Feminist critique of development strategies and practices has supported other values in the 
framework, too. Ecofeminism has supported the value of sustainability by linking gender 
inequity with environmental abuse and degradation. More recently, the importance of 
empowerment in development was underlined by researchers and advocates stressing the 
value of empowerment for women.  
In these various ways, and more, the framework of values for development ethics has been 
shaped by struggles against gender injustice in development. 
Concern for gender justice is also beneficial to development ethics in a second way, and that 
is by warning us not to assume that any of these values can be pursued in a gender-free way. 
Yes, worthwhile development must enhance human well-being, but we should not assume 
that the risks to well-being are the same for men and women, any more than we would 
assume that risks to their health are the same. Similarly for equity and empowerment, and 
human rights. The international community has for several decades affirmed that risks to 
women’s human rights are distinctive, which is recognized in the Convention to Eliminate 
All Discrimination Against Women.  
One might wonder whether this is true of every value in the development ethics framework. 
What about integrity against corruption? Does corruption pose differential risks for men and 
women? Unfortunately this question has not received much attention in recent research, 
which is more interested in the question of whether women are less corruptible than men. I 
scarcely know what to say about this, except to express my suspicion that placing women on 
moral pedestals has never achieved real equality.  
Despite these uncertainties, I think it is clear that development ethics has a great deal to learn 
from feminist cautioning that the values of worthwhile development cannot be achieved by 
policies that are oblivious to gender. One size simply does not fit all. 
So these are two ways in which development ethics has learned and has much more to learn 
from feminist advocates of gender justice. But now let’s turn the table, to ask what the latter 
may have to gain or learn from the former. I am going to approach this somewhat negatively, 
by first considering some arguments that feminist advocates of gender justice have nothing 
to learn from development ethics. My response to these arguments will lead to some broader 
and more positive remarks on how the ‘ruling ideas’ of any time (including ideas of 
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development) are best approached by any of us who oppose justice in any of its forms, 
including gender injustice. 
One argument against engaging in development ethics stems from an interpretation –   which 
I believe is a misinterpretation – of Vandana Shiva. Harm that is done to women by 
maldevelopment is Shiva’s central theme. The sources of this harm are political and 
economic forces that push relentlessly for inappopriate application of technology to the land, 
led by a masculinist ideology. (Shiva 1989, 1-37). Arturo Escobar cites approvingly Shiva’s 
call for an alternative, which, in her words, involves ‘a redefinition of growth and 
productivity as categories linked to the production, not the destruction, of life.... an 
ecological and feminist political project that legitimizes the ways of knowing and being that 
create wealth by enhancing life and diversity, and which delegitimizes the knowledge and 
practice of a culture of death as the basis for capital accumulation’ (Shiva 1989, cited in 
Escobar 1992). The question arises, is Shiva here calling for alternative forms of 
development, or is she calling for alternatives to development. Anti-development theorists 
like Escobar, Gustavo Estevez, and Wolfgang Sachs insist that only the latter makes sense 
(Sachs 1992). In their view, development is a single comprehensive paradigm which, in 
Escobar’s words ‘articulates the state with profits, patriarchy, and objectivizing science and 
technology’ (Escobar 1992). Hopes for worthwhile development, ethical development, 
equitable development, or gender justice in development are illusory. Development is a beast 
of just one species, and this kind of animal cannot change its spots. Development is 
necessarily maldevelopment. 
As I read Vandana Shiva, that is not her approach. She is generally very careful to identify 
specific forms and features of development that lead to maldevelopment; she does not hold 
that all development is maldevelopment, and what she calls for are alternative forms of 
development.1  
I support her on this point. We need a non-normative concept of ‘development’ that is 
neither too broad nor too narrow. It should not be true by definition that all development is 
worthwhile development, nor that development is maldevelopment. So how are we to define 
‘development’ in a way that is normatively non-committal? 
At one time some leading members of this Association believed that the term ‘development’ 
should refer to all positive social change. I disagreed, for two reasons. First, there are 
positive social changes that should not be considered ‘development’ –  for instance, the 
defeat of fascism in the Second World War. The war itself was surely not a development 
project. More broadly, conceiving of development as positive social change excludes 
maldevelopment. If, as development ethicists, we want others to recognize some instances of 
development as maldevelopment, then we must recognize maldevelopment as development.  
Moreover, and this is the key point, we must ask ourselves: with whom do we want to speak 
about the ethics of development? If the community with whom we want to speak includes 
those who affect or are affected by development, then we need a concept of development 
                                                 
1
 Her use of the term ‘development’ is generally (and increasingly) contextualized, as for instance 
specifying ‘economic development’, ‘development and growth’ (Shiva 2006, 15ff), ‘water 
development’, and ‘land development’ (Shiva 2002, 63,110). Her consistent practice of indicating 
spurious forms of ‘development’ with scare-quotes suggests that there is at least conceptual space for 
development that is not maldevelopment.  
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that includes all projects or processes that might be brought up in those conversations. For 
that purpose, I think of development as the enhanced production or distribution of perceived 
public or private goods. To keep this a non-normative concept, we can interpet ‘enhanced’ as 
what people consider to be enhanced, and ‘goods’ as perceived goods. In that way, we can 
recognize development without necessarily endorsing it or condemning it, and that is just the 
kind of concept we need in order to talk with people about whether particular development 
projects and strategies are worthwhile. 
If we adopt this or something like it as our non-normative concept of development, then it is 
clear that there are many means that can be tried for enhancing production and distribution of 
perceived public or private goods, so that development is not just one single and 
comprehensive paradigm. This is a concept of development that does not favour any 
particular conception of development. Economistic conceptions of development as growth 
are not ruled out, but neither are green conceptions that call for reducing or slowing 
economic growth (To ‘enhance’ production may not always be to increase it.) Similarly, the 
modernization of agriculture was one way in which development could be attempted, but not 
the only way – and here is Vandana Shiva’s starting point. Growth and modernization may 
be means of development, but ‘development’ should not simply mean growth, nor should it 
simply mean modernization.  
In short, it is crucial that we do not allow the concept of development to be reduced and 
restricted to any particular conception of development. There is also a political reason for 
taking this approach. The idea of development is arguably one of the ruling ideas of our 
time, or, as Antonio Gramsci would have said, it is a hegemonic idea. There are two 
approaches to these hegemonic ideas that advocates of social change can take. One approach 
would be to reject them categorically. Alternatively, they can be appropriated and 
progressively altered by and for people who are disadvantaged within the current 
relationships of power. According to the second, Gramscian approach, struggles over power, 
advantage, and disadvantage should also involve struggles over the meanings of the 
hegemonic ideas (Mouffe 1979). 
How does this apply to us? I believe that advocates of development ethics and advocates of 
gender justice can, if they wish, combine in numerous ways, in both struggles. In order to 
contest the effects of development, including the damaging effects of maldevelopment on 
women, it is necessary to challenge dominant conceptions of development. While I have 
singled out Vandana Shiva as an example, it would be difficult for anyone to engage in 
development ethics very deeply, without coming to reflect critically on dominant 
conceptions of development. More than that, creating and maintaining an intellectual space 
for such challenges is an essential function of development ethics. This, I think, is a further 
reason why those who are drawn to gender justice should also be drawn to development 
ethics. 
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